When we equate equivalent terms in the relations with y ( r ) and u(t) denoting the system output and input, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Stackelberg solution for a two-player nonzero-sum game has been studied in [1H4] . This strategy is a natural choice when one decision maker (DM), because of bias in the information structure, chooses to be a leader and the other DM a follower. However, in general there are more than two DM's in large-scale systems, such as in an oligopoly or a power system where the DM's have different information and different control objectives. An extension of the Stackelberg strategy to two groups of DM's using Nash strategy within each group and Stackelberg strategy between the two groups has been examined in [5] . The Stackelberg strategy has also been extended for the linear-quadratic open-loop continuous-time game to M-levels with particular emphasis on the three-level game in [6].
In this note, the Stackelberg strategy is extended to the case of M DM'S interacting in a leader-follower sense with all DM'S ranked according to their level of leading and following in the hierarchy of control strategy choice as suggested in [7] . Thus, due to a bias in the information sets available to each DM, one DM announces his strategy first, then another DM announces his strategy, and so on until all M
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DM'S have decided on their strategies. In this note, it will be assumed that the decision-making process is a h e a r hierarchy. That is, no two or more DM'S announce their strategies at the same time. This problem formulation applies to systems wherein there is a chain of command or a hierarchy of decision making.
DEFINITION OF THE FEEDBACK STACKELB~G STRATEGY
Consider a discrete-time dynamic system described by x(k+l)=f[x(k),u,(k),...,u,(k)l,
with M decision makers choosing controls u , , . -. ,u,, acting on the system in some manner. The ith decision maker desires to minimize a cost function given by
For M = 3 we assume that DM, announces his strategy first. DM2 then announces his strategy, which is a function of DM,'s strategy, and finally DM3 announces his strategy, which is a function of strategies by Denote the feedback Stackelberg strategies for decision makers 1, 2, and 3 by uf(k), ut(k), and u;(k), respectively. Denote the cost from time exists and is unique. Then the minimkhg control u, as a Function of
We denote the resulting controls when u:(k) is substituted in (4) and (3) bY
and u,*(k) = 1;3(k>Uf(k),Uf(k)).
The controls uf(k), u,*(k), and u,+(k) are defined to be the feedback Stackelberg strategies for decision makers 1, 2, and 3, respectively, for the 3-level game. It can be seen from ( 5 ) that DM,% feedback Stackelberg strategy is chosen in such a way that the reactions of DM2 and DM, to his control are taken into account. Similarly, DM, chooses his strategy to take into account the reaction of DM, to his strategy. Extension to the M-level case follows in a straightforward manner.
It can be seen that when M = 2 , this definition is the same as the definition for the two decision-maker feedback Stackelberg game. For DM,, decision makers one to i -1 are leaders and decision makers i + 1 to M are followers. Thus there is only one true leader, DM,, and there is only one true follower, DM,. The other decision makers have combinations of follower and leader characteristics. To DM,, i = 2,-. . ,M-1, the hierarchy of decision making for his leaders, DM, to DM,-,, is unimportant in his choice of control strategy. However, the hierarchy of his followers, DM,+, to DM,, is critical in his determination of control strategy. This is due to the fact that, to the ith decision maker, the control strategies of those above him in the decision-making hierarchy are announced before his strategy is computed. However, the ith decision maker must calculate the controls of those below himself in the hierarchy, which are dependent on number and ordering, in order to calculate his own control strategy.
LINEAR-QUADRATIC M-LEVEL FEEDBACK STACKELBERG GAME
Consider the h e a r state equation given by . . , N , it can be seen that the inverses in (11) and (12) exist. Moreover, these conditions ensure that the functionals Vi(k) are strictly convex and hence the minima are unique.
Examination of (13) shows that DMI shifts the eigenvalues of the feedback system first. Then DM2 and so on until all feedback gains have been taken into account. Since the leader is the first to shift the eigenvalues of the system, he shifts them in a way to take into account his knowledge of the reactions of the other decision makers. Even after the other decision makers have implemented their controls, the eigenvalues of the feedback system are at the best point for the leader. For the three-DM game we have N -2, N -3,. . . , 0; the state trajectory may now be found from (13); the cost to each player can be calculated from fxfii(0)x,.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This note has presented a feedback Stackelberg solution for a manyplayer game with the ordering of decision makers in a linear hierarchical structure. For the linear-quadratic problem, recursive equations have been derived for finding the multilevel feedback Stackelberg controls and sufficient conditions are given for the minima and controls to exist. . This note presents the first attempt to study the generalized inverse of such polynomial matrices. In particular, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for a generalized inverse, to have the same algebraic structure as the original matrix.
INTEGER MATRICES
Theorem 1, given below, contains the necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary matrix with elements which are integers, to have a generalized inverse also with integer elements. This result will be r e quired later in the note. 
where D is as defined in (3) and P and Q are each integer matrices with determinant +. 1 (such matrices are called invertible integer matrices). 
